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We propose a new approach for examining self-related aspects and phenomena. The
approach includes (1) a taxonomy and (2) an emphasis on multiple levels of mechanisms.
The taxonomy categorizes approximately eighty self-related phenomena according to
three primary functions involving the self: representing, effecting, and changing. The
representing self encompasses the ways in which people depict themselves, either
to themselves or to others (e.g., self-concepts, self-presentation). The effecting self
concerns ways in which people facilitate or limit their own traits and behaviors (e.g., self-
enhancement, self-regulation). The changing self is less time-limited than the effecting
self; it concerns phenomena that involve lasting alterations in how people represent
and control themselves (e.g., self-expansion, self-development). Each self-related phe-
nomenon within these three categories may be examined at four levels of interacting
mechanisms (social, individual, neural, and molecular). We illustrate our approach by
focusing on seven self-related phenomena.
Keywords: self, mechanisms, self-change, self-representation, self-regulation
Introduction
Social and clinical psychologists frequently use the concept of the self in their discussions of a wide
range of phenomena (e.g., Baumeister, 1999; Sedikides and Brewer, 2001; Leary and Tangney, 2003;
Alicke et al., 2005; Sedikides and Spencer, 2007). However, there is no general, unified psychological
theory of the self that can account for these phenomena. Thagard (2014) has proposed a view of the
self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. Like
James (1890) and Mead (1967), this view accommodates social, cognitive, and physiological aspects
of the self, but provides far more detail about the nature of the relevant mechanisms. Our aim in the
current paper is to show the applicability of the multilevel system account of the self to a large range
of phenomena.
We will present a new taxonomy that categorizes approximately eighty self-related phenomena
according to three primary aspects of the self: representing, effecting, and changing. The representing
self encompasses the ways in which people depict themselves, either to themselves or to others
(e.g., self-concepts, self-presentation). The effecting self concerns ways in which people facilitate
or limit their own traits and behaviors (e.g., self-enhancement, self-regulation). The changing self
is less time-limited than the effecting self; it concerns phenomena that involve lasting alterations
in how people represent and control themselves (e.g., self-expansion, self-development). After
presenting this taxonomy, we will describe how four levels of mechanisms—social, individual,
neural, and molecular—are relevant to understanding these phenomena about the self. It would be
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FIGURE 1 | Grouping of many self-phenomena into six main classes: self-representing (with three sub-categories), self-effecting (with two
sub-categories), and self-changing. Source: Thagard (2014).
premature to offer a full theory of the self, because not enough
is known about the nature of these mechanisms and how they
produce the relevant phenomena. But we hope our taxonomy
and outline of relevant mechanisms provides a new and useful
framework for theorizing about the self.
A Taxonomy of Self-Phenomena
There aremore than eighty frequently discussed topics that we call
the self-phenomena. More accurately, each of these topics should
be understood as a group of phenomena. For example, there are
many empirical findings about self-esteem that should count as
distinctive phenomena to be explained, so there are potentially
hundreds of findings forwhich a scientific theory of the self should
be able to account.
Fortunately, the task of accounting for all of the self-
phenomena, through causal explanations of the large number
of empirical findings about them, can be managed by grouping
the phenomena according to three primary aspects of the self:
representing, effecting, and changing. All of the self-phenomena
fall primarily under one of these functional groups, although a
few are related to more than one group. Figure 1 summarizes the
proposed organization of self-phenomena that we now discuss in
more detail.
The Representing Self
A representation is a structure or activity that stands for some-
thing, and many of the self-phenomena listed in Figure 1 concern
ways in which people represent themselves. The representing self
can roughly be divided into three subgroups concerned with (1)
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depicting oneself to oneself, (2) depicting oneself to others, and
(3) evaluating oneself according to one’s own standards.
Themost general terms for depicting oneself to oneself are self-
knowledge and self-understanding, which seem roughly equiva-
lent. Self-concepts and self-schemata are both mental ingredients
of self-knowledge, serving as cognitive structures to represent
different aspects of the self. (Later we provide a more detailed
account of self-concepts.) Self-interest consists in the collection
of one’s personal goals, conscious or unconscious. Self-identity
and self-image are also ways in which one represents oneself to
oneself, although they may also contribute to how one represents
oneself to others. Self-discovery and self-projection are processes
that involve self-representation.
Several aspects of depicting oneself to oneself assume conscious
experience, as in self-awareness and other phenomena listed in
Figure 1. Such experience is not purely cognitive, as it can also
involve prominent affective components such as moods and emo-
tions. Another set of phenomena that involve depicting oneself
to oneself includes self-deception and self-delusion, in which
the representation of self is false. The second division within
the group of self-representing phenomena involves depicting and
communicating oneself to others.
The third sub-group of self-phenomena in the representing
category concerns the evaluation of the self, either as on ongoing
process or as the product that results from the evaluation. Phe-
nomena concerned with the process of evaluation include self-
appraisal. There are many products that result from this process,
including both general assessments such as self-confidence and
particular emotional reactions such as self-pity.
The Effecting Self
The self does more than just represent itself; it also does things
to itself, including facilitating its own functioning in desir-
able ways and limiting its functioning to prevent undesirable
consequences. Self-phenomena that have a facilitating effect
include self-actualization. Self-evaluation can also produce the
self-knowledge that unconstrained actions may have undesirable
consequences, as in excessive eating, drinking, drug use, and
dangerous liaisons. Accordingly, there is a set of important phe-
nomena concerning limits that people put on their own behav-
ior, including self-control. All of these self-effecting phenomena
involve people encouraging or discouraging their own behaviors,
but they do not bring about fundamental, longer lasting changes
in the self, which is the third and probably rarest aspect of the self.
The Changing Self
Over a lifetime, people change as the result of aging and expe-
riences such as major life events. Some self-phenomena such
as self-development concern processes of change. The changes
can involve alterations in self-representing, when people come to
apply different concepts to themselves, and also self-effecting, if
people manage to change the degree to which they are capable
of either facilitating desired behaviors or limiting undesired ones.
Whereas short-termpsychotherapy is aimed at dealingwith small-
scale problems in self-representing and self-efficacy, long-term
psychotherapy may aim at larger alterations in the underlying
nature of the self.
The proposed grouping of self-phenomena summarized in
Figure 1 is not meant to be exhaustive, as there are aspects of
self that are described by words without the “self ” prefix, such as
agency, autonomy, personhood, and resilience, as well as more
esoteric terms that do use the prefix. But the diagram serves to
provide an idea of the large range of phenomena concerning the
self. Our goal is to show the applicability of the multilevel account
of the self to this range of phenomena, by selecting phenomena
from each of the six main classes in Figure 1. It would be tedious
to apply the multilevel theory to more than eighty phenomena,
so we take a representative sampling that includes: self-concepts,
self-presentation, self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-regulation,
self-expansion, and self-development. Each of these has aspects
that need to be understood by considering the self as a system that
operates at social, individual, neural, and molecular levels.
Figure 2 displays the relevant levels and their interconnections.
We understand a mechanism to be a system of parts whose inter-
actions produce regular changes (Bechtel, 2008; Thagard, 2012).
The social level consists of people who communicate with each
other. The individual level consists of mental representations and
computational procedures that operate on them. The neural level
consists of neurons that excite and inhibit each other. Finally,
the molecular level consists of genes, proteins, neurotransmitters,
and hormones that affect neural operation. For defense of this
account of levels of mechanisms, and the occurrence of causal
links between social and molecular levels, see Thagard (2014).
We do not mean to suggest that there are three separate selves
capable of representing, effecting, and changing, any more than
we implied that there are separate social, individual, neural, and
molecular selves. We especially want to avoid the ridiculous sug-
gestion that a person might consist of twelve different selves com-
bining three different aspects at four different levels. Our goal is to
display the unity of the self, not just its amazing diversity. Unifica-
tion arises first from seeing the interconnections of the four levels
described earlier, and second from recognizing how the intercon-
nected mechanisms produce all three of the self ’s functions.
The Representing Self
The scientific value of understanding the self as a multilevel
system depends on its fruitfulness in generating explanations
of important empirical findings concerning the various self-
phenomena. We will attempt to show the relevance of multi-
ple mechanisms for understanding three phenomena that are
involved in representational aspects of the self: self-concepts,
self-presentation, and self-esteem. Respectively, these involve rep-
resenting oneself to oneself, representing oneself to others, and
evaluating oneself.
Self-Concepts (Representing Oneself to Oneself)
Self researchers distinguish between self-concept, which involves
content—one’s thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge about the
self—and self-esteem, which involves evaluation—evaluation of
oneself as good, bad, worthy, unworthy, and so forth. Here we
focus on self-concepts, considering them at individual, social,
neural, and molecular levels. Psychologists studying the self no
longer think of people as possessing a single, unified self-concept,
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FIGURE 2 | Diagram of the self as a multilevel system. Lines with arrows indicate causality. Thick lines indicate composition. Source: Thagard (2014).
but as possessing self-views in many domains (Baumeister, 1999).
People have various concepts that they apply to characterize
themselves with respect to features such as gender, race, ethnicity,
nationality, religion, occupation, hobbies, personality, and
physical characteristics. For example, a man might think of
himself as an intellectual, Canadian, and aging father. Moreover,
not all content of those various self-views can be held in mind at
once. The part of self-concept that is present in awareness at a
given time has been called the “working self-concept” (Markus
and Kunda, 1986). What is the nature of the concepts that people
apply to themselves, and what are the mechanisms underlying
these applications?
The individual level of mental representations is clearly highly
relevant to understanding concepts including ones about the self.
What kind of mental representations are concepts? Unfortunately,
there is no single currently available psychological theory of con-
cepts that can be applied to self-concepts. Debate is ongoing about
whether concepts should be understood as prototypes, collections
of exemplars, or theoretical explanations (Murphy, 2002; Mach-
ery, 2009), and all of these aspects are relevant to self-concepts
(Kunda, 1999, Ch. 2). For example, the concept of extravert carries
with it prototypical conditions such as enjoying social interac-
tions, exemplars such as Bill Clinton, and explanations such as
people going to parties because they are extraverted. Belowwe will
suggest how all of these aspects of concepts can be integrated at the
neural level.
Psychological mechanisms such as priming carried out by
spreading activation between concepts explain how different con-
cepts get applied in different situations. For example, people
at parties may be especially prone to think of themselves as
extraverted. Such explanations require also taking into account
social mechanisms such as communication and other forms of
interaction. Then the causes of applying the concept extraverted
to oneself include social mechanisms as well as the individual
mechanism of spreading activation among concepts.
The vast literature on self-concepts points to the interplay of the
individual and social levels in amyriad of ways. First is research on
social comparison, which shows that one’s working self-concept
depends on the other people present (Wood, 1989). Ads with
skinny models can make one feel fat, and unkempt people can
make one feel well-groomed. When asked to describe themselves,
people tend to list characteristics that make them distinctive in
their immediate social setting. A woman in a group of men is
especially likely to list her gender, and a white man in a group
of African–American men is especially likely to list his race (e.g.,
McGuire et al., 1978).
More permanent aspects of one’s social surround can have
more consequential effects on self-concept. For example, college
graduates’ career aspirations depend on their standing relative to
their peers at their own college, regardless of the college’s standing
relative to other institutions (Davis, 1966). A student who earns
high grades at institutions where grading is easier tends to have
higher career aspirations than an equally qualified student at a
more competitive college. This phenomenon has been called “the
campus as a frog pond”; for the frog in a shallow pond aims his
[or her] sights higher than an equally talented frog in a deep pond
(Pettigrew, 1967, p. 257). According to social identity theory, one
psychological basis of group discrimination is that people identify
with some groups and contrast themselves with other groups that
are viewed less favorably (Tajfel, 1974).
Self-concepts are also influenced by the culture in which
one lives. Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that whereas
Westerners havemore “independent self-construals,” in which the
self is autonomous and guided by internal thoughts and feelings,
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Asians have more “interdependent self-construals,” in which the
self is connected with others and guided, at least in part, by others’
thoughts and feelings.
Another way that the individual and social levels intersect
with respect to self-concept involves the “looking-glass self ” or
“reflected appraisals”—the idea that people come to see them-
selves as others see them. This idea has been prominent in social
science for some time (e.g., Mead, 1967), but research in social
psychology in the last few decades leads to a different conclusion:
People do not see very clearly how others, especially strangers,
see them, and instead believe that others see them as they see
themselves (see Tice and Wallace, 2003, for a review). Instead
of others’ views influencing one’s self-view, then, one’s self-view
determines how one thinks others view oneself. It is possible,
however, that within close relationships, the reflected self plays a
greater role in shaping the self-concept (Tice and Wallace, 2003).
Feedback from others can also affect self-concepts, and not just
in the way one might expect. For example, although people may
think of themselves as more attractive when they have been told
they are attractive, people sometimes resist others’ feedback in
various ways (Swann and Schroeder, 1995). For example, when
people with high self-esteem (HSEs) learn they have failed in one
domain, they recruit positive self-conceptions in other domains
(e.g., Dodgson and Wood, 1998). People are more likely to incor-
porate others’ feedback into their self-views if that feedback is
close to their pre-existing self-view than if it is too discrepant
(Shrauger and Rosenberg, 1970).
Self-concepts also change with one’s relationships. Two longi-
tudinal studies showed that people’s self-descriptions increased
in diversity after they fell in love; people appear to adopt some
of their beloved’s characteristics as their own (Aron et al., 1995).
Several studies also indicate that cognitive representations of one’s
romantic partner become part of one’s own self-representation (as
reviewed by Aron, 2003). Andersen and Chen (2002) describe a
“relational self ” in which knowledge about the self is linked with
knowledge about significant others.
Interactions with other people also affect the self-concept
through a process called “behavioral confirmation,” whereby peo-
ple act to confirm other people’s expectations (Darley and Fazio,
1980). For example, when male participants were led to believe
that a woman they were speaking to over an intercom was physi-
cally attractive, that woman ended up behaving in a more appeal-
ing way than when the man thought she was unattractive (Snyder
et al., 1977). Presumably, a man’s expectation that a woman is
attractive leads him to act especially warmly toward her, which
in turn brings to the fore a working self-concept for her that
is especially friendly and warm. Evidence suggests that when
people believe that others will accept them, they behave warmly,
which in turn leads those others to accept them; when they
expect rejection, they behave coldly, which leads to less acceptance
(Stinson et al., 2009). More consequential results of behavioral
confirmation are evident in a classic study of the “Pygmalion”
effect, in which teachers were led to have high expectations for
certain students (randomly determined), who then improved in
academic performance (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968).
So far we have considered social effects on the self-concept.
In turn, one’s self-concept influences one’s judgments of others
in many ways. In his review of this large literature, Dunning
(2003) grouped such effects into threemain categories. First, in the
absence of information about others, people assume that others
are similar to themselves. Second, in their impressions of another
person, people emphasize the domains in which they themselves
are strong or proficient. Third, when judging others on some
dimension, such as physical fitness, people tend to use themselves
as a benchmark. Given a man who takes a daily 20-min walk,
athletes will judge him to be unfit, whereas couch potatoes will
judge him to be highly fit.
Finally, researchers have examined not only the content of
self-concepts, but their clarity. People with clearer self-concepts
respond to questions about themselves more quickly, extremely,
and confidently, and their self-concepts are more stable over time
(Campbell, 1990). Recent research has pointed to social influ-
ences on self-concept clarity. For example, clarity of self-concepts
regarding particular traits depends in part on how observable
those traits are to others (Stinson et al., 2008b). And when people
with low self-esteem (LSEs) receive more social acceptance than
they are accustomed to, they become less clear in their self-
concepts; the same is true when people with high self-esteem
encounter social rejection (Stinson et al., 2010). In sum, social fac-
tors are as relevant to understanding the operation of self-concepts
as are factors involving the operation of mental representations in
individual minds.
Moving to the level of neural mechanisms provides a way of
seeing how concepts can function in all the ways that psycholo-
gists have investigated—as prototypes, exemplars, and theories, if
concepts are understood as patterns of neural activity (Thagard,
2010, p. 78),
Simulations with artificial neural networks enable us to see how
concepts can have properties associated with sets of exemplars
and prototypes. When a neural network is trained with multiple
examples, it forms connections between its neurons that enable
it to store the features of those examples implicitly. These same
connections also enable the population of connected neurons to
behave like a prototype, recognizing instances of a concept in
accord with their ability to match various typical features rather
than having to satisfy a strict set of conditions. Thus even sim-
ulated populations of artificial neurons much simpler than real
ones in the brain can capture the exemplar and prototype aspects
of concepts.
It is trickier to show how neural networks can be used in causal
explanations, but current research is investigating how neural
patterns can be used for explanatory purposes (Thagard and Litt,
2008). Blouw et al. (forthcoming) present a detailed model of how
neural populations can function as exemplars, prototypes, and
rule-based explanations.
Another advantage of moving down to the neural level is that
it becomes easier to apply multimodal concepts such as ones con-
cerned with physical appearance. People who think of themselves
as thin or fat, young or old, and quiet or loud, are applying to
themselves representations that are not just verbal but also involve
other modalities such as vision and sound. Because much is
known about the neural basis of sensory systems, the neural level
of analysis makes it easier to see how human concepts can involve
representations tied to sensory systems, not only for objects such
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as cars with associated visual and auditory images, but also for
kinds of people (Barsalou, 2008).
Brain scanning experiments reveal important neural aspects
of self-concepts. Tasks that involve reflecting on one’s own per-
sonality traits, feelings, physical attributes, attitudes, or prefer-
ences produce preferential activation in the medial prefrontal
cortex (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Mitchell, 2009; Jenkins
and Mitchell, 2011). Neural correlates of culturally different self-
construals have also have been demonstrated. When East Asian
participants were primed with an independent self-construal,
right ventrolateral PFC (prefrontal cortex) activity was more
active for their own face relative to a coworker’s face, whereas
when primed with an interdependent self-construal, this region
was activated for both faces (Sui and Han, 2007).
Once concepts are understood partly in neural terms, the rel-
evance of molecular mechanisms becomes evident too, because
of the important role of affect and emotion in self-concepts. For
most people, thinking of themselves as young and thin carries
positive affect, whereas thinking of themselves as old and fat
carries negative valence. When such valences are interpreted neu-
rologically, molecular mechanisms involving neurotransmitters
and hormones can be applied. For example, the pleasurable feel-
ings associated with young, thin, and other concepts that people
enjoy applying to themselves plausibly result from activity in
neural regions rich in the neurotransmitter dopamine, such as
the nucleus accumbens. On the negative side, negative feelings
such as anxiety are associated with activity in the amygdala, whose
neurons have receptors for the stress hormone cortisol as well as
various neurotransmitters. Hence if we want to understand why
people much prefer to apply some concepts to themselves and
different concepts to others, it is helpful to consider the molecular
mechanisms that underlie emotion as well as social, individual,
and neural mechanisms. Of course, merely knowing about phys-
iological correlates does not provide causal explanations, which
requires mechanisms that link physiology to behavior.
Self-concepts illustrate complex interactions among multiple
levels, belying oversimplified reductionist views that see causality
as only emanating from lower to higher levels. For example, a
social interaction such as a job interview can have the psycho-
logical effects of applications of particular concepts (e.g., nervous
or competent) to oneself. Activation of these concepts consists of
instantiation of patterns of firing in neural populations, attended
by increases and decreases in levels of various chemicals such as
cortisol and dopamine. Changes in chemical levels can in turn lead
to social changes, as when high cortisol makes a person socially
awkward, producing counterproductive social interactions that
then lead to self-application of negative concepts. Under such
circumstances, the four levels can provide an amplifying feedback
loop, from the social to the neuromolecular and back again.
Self-Presentation (Representing Oneself
to Others)
The modes of self-representing discussed so far largely concern
how one thinks about oneself, although some aspects of self-
image and self-identity also sometimes concern how one wants
others to think about oneself. Self-presentation is the central phe-
nomenon for representing oneself to others. It has been discussed
extensively by sociologists such as Goffman (1959) and by social
psychologists (Leary and Kowalski, 1990). We want to show that
self-presentation involves multilevel interacting mechanisms.
Thirty years of research by social psychologists highlight the
interplay of the individual and social levels in self-presentation
(Schlenker, 2003). One’s goals, at the individual level, affect the
social level. People have a basic need for relatedness, for belonging
to groups of people that they care about (Baumeister and Leary,
1995; Deci and Ryan, 2000). People know that they are more
likely to be accepted by others who have a positive impression of
them, so it is natural that people typically want to create a favor-
able impression. However, people’s goals sometimes lead them to
present themselves in socially undesirable ways (for references,
see Schlenker, 2003). They may self-deprecate to lower others’
expectations, or try to appear intimidating to generate fear.
The social level also affects the individual level. One’s audience
influences one’s self-presentation goals. For example, people tend
to be more self-aggrandizing with strangers and more modest
with friends (Tice et al., 1995). Particularly striking evidence of
the social level affecting the individual level comes from studies
indicating that one’s self-presentation to others can influence one’s
private self-concept (see Schlenker, 2003; Tice andWallace, 2003).
For example, in one study, participants who had been randomly
assigned to present themselves as extraverted were more likely
than those who had presented themselves as introverted to later
rate themselves as extraverted, and even to behave in a more out-
going fashion, by sitting closer and talking more to others (Fazio
et al., 1981). Such self-concept change does not seem to occur
unless one’s actions are observed by others (Tice and Wallace,
2003), which again emphasizes the social level. In reviewing the
self-presentation literature, Baumeister (1998, p. 705) stated:
People use self-presentation to construct an identity for them-
selves. Most people have a certain ideal image of the person they
would like to be. It is not enoughmerely to act like that person or to
convince oneself that one resembles that person. Identity requires
social validation.
Self-presentation is also dependent on neural mechanisms.
People naturally fear not being accepted by others, and a variety
of studies have found that the social pain of rejection involves
some of the same brain areas as physical pain, such as the peri-
aqueductal gray (MacDonald and Leary, 2005). On the other
hand, being accepted by others produces pleasure, which involves
activation of brain areas such as the nucleus accumbens (Ike-
moto and Panksepp, 1999). Izuma et al. (2009) found that the
prospect of social approval activates the ventral striatum, which
includes the nucleus accumbens. Of course, these neural processes
are also molecular ones, with dopamine and opioids associated
with positive social experiences, and stress hormones like cortisol
associated with negative ones. For example, when people have to
give a public speech, often a painful instance of self-presentation,
their cortisol levels increase, which may even produce behaviors
that undermine the effectiveness of their attempts to produce a
good impression (Al’Absi et al., 1997).
Another substance at the molecular level that is likely to be
involved in self-presentation is oxytocin, a neuropeptide that
has been linked to various social behaviors (e.g., Carter, 1998).
Oxytocin is implicated when successful self-presentation requires
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accurately “reading” other people to understand what would
impress or please them, because oxytocin has been linked with
social recognition (Kavaliers and Choleris, 2011), empathic accu-
racy (Rodrigues et al., 2009; Bartz et al., 2010), the processing
of positive social cues (Unkelbach et al., 2008), and discerning
whether others are trustworthy and should be approached or not
(Mikolajczak et al., 2010). Thus, self-presentation involves the
complex interaction of social, individual, neural, and molecular
mechanisms.
Self-Esteem (Evaluating Oneself)
The third major kind of self-representing is self-evaluation, which
can involve processes such as self-appraisal and self-monitoring,
and result in products that range from self-love to self-loathing.
We discuss self-esteem as a sample product.
Self-esteem refers to one’s overall evaluation of and liking for
oneself. People differ from each other in their characteristic levels
of self-esteem, which remain quite stable over time, yet people
also fluctuate in their self-esteem around their own average levels.
“State self-esteem” refers to one’s feelings about oneself at the
moment.Measures of explicit self-esteemobtained by surveysmay
differ from measures of implicit self-esteem, which are thought
to be based associations that are unconscious, or at least less
cognitively accessible (Zeigler-Hill and Jordan, 2011).
At the individual level, self-esteem involves the application
of self-concepts with positive or negative emotional valence, for
example thinking of oneself as a success or failure in important
pursuits such as love, work, and play. When people focus on
positive aspects of themselves, their state self-esteem increases
(e.g., McGuire and McGuire, 1996).
Considerable evidence indicates that social experiences are
central to both trait and state self-esteem.According to attachment
theory, people begin to learn about their self-worth as infants, in
their interactions with caregivers. If the caregiver is loving and
responsive to the infant’s needs, the infant develops a model of the
self that is worthy of love and responsiveness. If not, the child will
develop negative self-models and be anxious in relationships (e.g.,
Holmes et al., 2005). We have already discussed how social com-
parisons can influence one’s self-concept; comparisons with other
people also can boost or deflate one’s self-esteem (Wood, 1989).
Social acceptance may be the chief determinant of self-esteem.
Leary’s sociometer theory proposed that the very existence of self-
esteem is due to the need to monitor the degree to which one is
accepted and included by other people (Leary and Baumeister,
2000). Indeed, the more people feel included by other people
in general, as well as accepted and loved by specific people in
their lives, the higher their trait self-esteem (Leary and Baumeis-
ter, 2000). Numerous experimental studies indicate that rejection
leads to drops in state self-esteem (e.g., Wood et al., 2009a).
Interpersonal stressors in the everyday lives of university students
are associated with declines in state self-esteem (Stinson et al.,
2008a). In contrast, being in a long-term relationship with a loving
partner can raise the self-esteem of people with low self-esteem
(Murray et al., 1996).
The connection between the individual and social levels of self
is also evident in research on how individuals’ self-esteem-related
goals influence their social lives. A vast social psychological lit-
erature reveals that motivations to maintain, protect, or improve
self-esteem can, for example, guide howpeople present themselves
to others (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1989), lead people to compare
themselves with others who are less fortunate so as to boost their
own spirits (Wood et al., 1985), and lead them to stereotype other
people in order to feel better about themselves (Fein and Spencer,
1997; Sinclair and Kunda, 2000).
We have repeatedly described the neural and molecular under-
pinnings of self-representations involving emotions, and the
account of self-concepts as patterns of neural activity associated
with particular kinds of neurochemical activity applies directly to
self-esteem. Self-esteem is connected with depression, which has
been examined at the neural level. Depression and self-esteem are
substantially inversely correlated (e.g., with rs reaching 0.60 and
 0.70 s; Watson et al., 2002); low self-esteem is even one of the
symptoms of depression. Depression is well known to have neu-
rotransmitter correlates and to be associated with brain changes.
Evidence is mounting that social acceptance and rejection are
accompanied by changes at the neural level (e.g., Eisenberger
et al., 2003, 2007; Way et al., 2009). For example, in one study,
participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) while they viewed words (e.g., boring, interesting)
that they believed to be feedback from another person. The
rejection-induced drops in self-esteem that we described earlier
were accompanied by greater activity in rejection-related neural
regions (dorsal ACC, anterior insula; Eisenberger et al., 2011).
Neuroimaging studies suggest that the social pain caused by rejec-
tion involve the same brain areas as does physical pain (namely,
dorsal ACC activity), whereas signs of social acceptance have been
associated with subgenual ACC activity (Somerville et al., 2006),
and ventral striatum activity (Izuma et al., 2008), neural regions
associated with reward (see Lieberman, 2010).
Social threats not only lead to changes in the neural level, but
also elicit a host of physiological responses, which point to the
links between the social and molecular level. Dickerson et al.
(2011) reviewed evidence of cardiovascular (e.g., blood pressure,
heart rate), neuroendocrine (e.g., cortisol reactivity), and immune
(e.g., inflammatory activity) changes, as well as ways in which
social threats “influence the regulation of these systems” (p. 799).
Connections between the social level (rejection and acceptance
by others) and the neural level (anterior cingulate and medial
prefrontal cortex) have also been associated with the individual
level (self-esteem). People who were low in self-esteem differed in
their neural responses from those high in self-esteemwhen others
evaluated them (Somerville et al., 2010) or others excluded them
(Onoda et al., 2010).
Similarly, individual differences in traits that have been
associated with trait self-esteem, rejection sensitivity and
attachment styles, have also been linked with differences in
neural responses to rejection. Burklund et al. (2007) found that
rejection-sensitive people had increased dorsal anterior cingulate
activity in response to disapproving facial expressions. Zayas
et al. (2009) found that women who differed in attachment
styles (which are associated with self-esteem) differed in their
neural responses to partner rejection, as reflected in event-
related potentials. There is some evidence that the causes of low
self-esteem may be genetic as well as social (Roy et al., 1995;
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 3347
Thagard and Wood Eighty self-related phenomena
Neiss et al., 2002), which provides another reason for moving
down to the molecular level in order to consider how genes
affecting neural processing might be involved in self-esteem. The
operation of the molecular level also may underlie self-esteem
differences in responses to stress. Taylor et al. (2003) found that
people who had positive self-appraisals had lower cardiovascular
responses to stress, more rapid cardiovascular recovery, and lower
baseline cortisol levels than people with negative self-appraisals.
Furthermore, additional research by Taylor et al. (2008) links
these findings with the neural level. Participants with greater
psychosocial resources, including higher self-esteem along
with other characteristics such as optimism and extraversion,
exhibited lower amygdala activity during threat regulation, which
appeared to account for their lower cortisol reactivity (Taylor
et al., 2008). These psychosocial resources appear to be linked
with the oxytocin receptor gene (Saphire-Bernstein et al., 2011).
The interplay of three levels—social, individual, and molecu-
lar—is suggested by research by Stinson et al. (2008a). Two studies
of university students yielded evidence consistent with their pre-
diction that low self-esteem (individual level) led to interpersonal
problems (social level), which in turn resulted in health problems
(e.g., missed classes due to illness and visits to the physician).
Health problems indicate changes at the molecular level as they
imply physiological changes. Dickerson et al. (2011) have made a
compelling case that the physiological responses brought about by
social threats can worsen physical health.
Considering self-esteem at the neural andmolecular levels may
provide explanations for why self-esteem in some individuals is
less influenced by life experience than learning theories would
explain. For example, not all successful people have high self-
esteem (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2003a), and it is possible that
the exceptions may arise from underlying neural and molecular
differences that the individual level does not capture.
The Effecting Self
In addition to the dozens of self-phenomena concerned with self-
representation, there are many phenomena concerned with the
self attempting to modify its own states and behavior. These self-
effecting phenomena fall into two groups, self-facilitating cases
in which one attempts to foster positive aspects of oneself, and
self-limiting cases in which one attempts to prevent the behav-
ioral expression of negative aspects of oneself. We will discuss
self-enhancement as an important kind of self-facilitation, and
self-regulation as an important kind of self-limitation.
Self-Enhancement
Self-enhancement, the motive to develop and maintain a positive
self-view, has been a dominant topic in the social psychological
literature for decades. Self-enhancement has been seen as a moti-
vation guiding much of human behavior, with some researchers
concluding that it is the paramount self-related motive, overrid-
ing other goals such as self-accuracy and self-consistency (e.g.,
Baumeister, 1998; but see Kwang and Swann, 2010). However,
a wealth of self-verification studies have provided compelling
evidence that people also want to confirm their self-views and to
get others to see themas they see themselves (Swann, 2012).Hence
self-verification can sometimes be self-limiting and sometimes
self-facilitating.
Research has identified many strategies of self-enhancement.
To cope with failure, for example, people may attribute the failure
externally (e.g., say the test is unfair), minimize the failure, focus
on other positive aspects of themselves, derogate other people, or
make downward comparisons—that is, compare themselves with
others who are inferior (e.g., Blaine and Crocker, 1993; Dodgson
and Wood, 1998). Over and over again, research has found that
the people who engage in such self-enhancement strategies are
dispositionally high in self-esteem, rather than low in self-esteem
(e.g., Blaine and Crocker, 1993). This self-esteem difference may
occur because people with high self-esteem are more motivated
than peoplewith low self-esteem to repair unhappymoods (Heim-
pel et al., 2002); or because HSEs are more motivated than LSEs
to feel good about themselves (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1989); or
because LSEs are equally motivated to self-enhance, but cannot as
readily claim or defend a positive view of themselves (e.g., Blaine
and Crocker, 1993).
One self-enhancement strategy deserves mention because it
is a mainstay of self-help books and the popular press: positive
self-statements. People facing a stressor, cancer patients, and
people chronically low in self-esteem are encouraged to say to
themselves such things as, “I am a beautiful person” and “I can
do this!” Despite the popularity of positive self-statements and
the widespread assumption that they work, their effectiveness
was not subjected to scientific scrutiny until recently. Wood
et al. (2009b) found that repeating the statement, “I am a lovable
person” improved people’s moods only for those who already had
high self-esteem. For people with low self-esteem, the statement
actually backfired, worsening their moods and their feelings
about themselves.
A strikingly different self-enhancement strategy is “self-
affirmation” (Steele, 1988). As studied by social psychologists,
self-affirmation does not refer to saying positive things to oneself,
but to much more subtle methods involving the expression of
one’s values. Self-affirmation strategies have included writing a
paragraph concerning a value one cherishes (e.g., politics, social
connections), or evenmerely completing a scale highlighting such
values. Such strategies seem to be self-enhancing in that they
reduce defensiveness (e.g., Crocker et al., 2008), reduce stereo-
typing (Fein and Spencer, 1997), make people more open to
self-evaluation (Spencer et al., 2001), and can substitute for other
methods of self-enhancement (e.g., Wood et al., 1999).
Although self-enhancement may seem to be a private mat-
ter, operating at the individual level, the social level is clearly
influential. Most threats to self-esteem arise in social contexts
when feedback from others or others’ behavior leads people to
doubt their preferred view of themselves, or to feel devalued
or rejected. Hence self-enhancement results from the process of
self-evaluation, whose social causes and context we have already
discussed. In addition, self-enhancement processes may enlist
the social level. Some of the self-enhancement strategies iden-
tified above, such as downward comparisons and derogating
other people, involve using the social realm to boost oneself at
the individual level. Another example comes from research on
the triggers of stereotyping. Fein and Spencer (1997) showed
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that after they fail, people were especially likely to seize on a
stereotype of Jewish women. Similarly, after receiving negative
feedback, people derogated the person who delivered the feed-
back, if that person was a woman rather than a man (Sinclair
and Kunda, 2000). Other social strategies of self-enhancement
can include being boastful and overconfident (e.g., Colvin et al.,
1995), helping others (e.g., Brown and Smart, 1991), and aggress-
ing against others (Twenge and Campbell, 2003). People may
also enhance themselves through their group memberships and
social identities (Banaji and Prentice, 1994). Self-enhancement
research, then, reveals links between the individual and social
levels of self because the social world often elicits the need for self-
enhancement, and certain self-enhancement strategies involve
the interpersonal realm. In addition, because self-enhancement
can encourage or diminish stereotyping, aggression, and proso-
cial behavior, self-enhancement clearly has many potential social
consequences.
That self-enhancement also operates at the molecular level is
shown by a study of self-affirmation. Participants who engaged in
a values-affirmation task before they faced a stressor had lower
cortisol responses to stress than did participants who had not
engaged in values-affirmation (Creswell et al., 2005).
Self-enhancement also operates at the neural level as it involves
applications of concepts such as loveable which, as we argued
earlier, can be understood as patterns of activation in populations
of neurons. The study by Wood et al. (2009a) showed that self-
statements can alter positive and negative moods, which plausi-
bly involves alteration of activities of neurotransmitters such as
dopamine. Better understanding of the neural and genetic deter-
minants of low self-esteem could provide the basis for explaining
why positive self-statements can have negative effects on people
with low self-esteem.
Self-Regulation
Although self researchers were long preoccupied with the topics
of self-concept and self-esteem, they have come to appreciate that
“self-regulation is one of the most important functions of the
self ” (Gailliot et al., 2008, p. 474). Self-regulation concerns how
people pursue their goals or try to control their own behavior,
thoughts, or feelings. An idea discussed earlier in the section
on self-evaluation—that people continually compare themselves
with standards—is central tomany theories of self-regulation (e.g.,
Carver and Scheier, 1990). Such theories posit that when people
experience a discrepancy between a standard and their own stand-
ing (behavior, thoughts, or feelings) on the relevant dimension,
they deliberately or even automatically attempt to reduce that
discrepancy, in one of three ways. They can try to adjust their
behavior (or thoughts or feelings) so that it meets the standard,
change their standards, or exit the situation. Self-regulation is
successful when the discrepancy is eliminated or reduced (e.g.,
Carver and Scheier, 1990).
The biological aspects of the self are most obvious in the self-
limiting phenomena aimed at controlling or managing excessive
desires for food, alcohol, drugs, sex, or inactivity. Such desires
are all rooted in neural and molecular mechanisms that must be
counteracted in order to overcome self-destructive behaviors such
as overeating. We will not attempt a comprehensive account of
all the phenomena concerned with limiting the self, but discuss
three main foci of self-regulation research in recent years: goal
pursuit, emotion regulation, and ego-depletion—how exercising
self-control in one domain diminishes one’s capacity to do so in a
second domain.
Research on social comparison establishes a basic connection
between the individual and social levels. Tomeet such goals as self-
evaluation, self-improvement, and self-enhancement, individuals
compare themselves with other people (Wood, 1989). In this case,
other people serve as the standards formeeting one’s goal progress.
Other people can even influence which goals we adopt. Fitzsi-
mons and her colleagues have found that observing a stranger’s
goal-directed behavior can lead people to pursue the same goals
themselves, or to synchronize their goal pursuits with others,
with interesting consequences. For example, people who observe
others fail work harder, and people who observe others succeed
take it easy (McCullough et al., 2010). Even being in the presence
of someone who was a stranger a few minutes before, but who
shares similarities such as tastes in movies, can lead one to adopt
the other’s goals as one’s own (Walton et al., 2012). Such effects
can even occur subconsciously. For example, when participants
who had a goal to achieve to please their mother were primed
with their mother, they outperformed control participants on an
achievement task (Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003).
One’s own goals also affect one’s relationships with others. Peo-
ple draw closer to others who are instrumental in helping them to
progress toward their goals, and distance themselves from others
who do not promote such progress (Fitzsimons and Shah, 2008).
People seem to cultivate a social environment for themselves that
promotes their goals, especially when their progress toward their
goals is poor (Fitzsimons and Fishbach, 2010).
Regulation of emotions is an important topic in clinical, social,
and cross-cultural psychology (Vandekerckhove et al., 2008).
Research on emotion regulation—which concerns how people try
to manage their emotional states—has amply demonstrated the
interplay between the individual and social levels. For example,
people try to adjust their moods in preparation for an upcoming
social interaction, according to the social requirements expected
(Erber and Erber, 2000). In addition, social events affect one’s
emotion regulation: Rejection experiences appear to lead people
with low self-esteem to feel less deserving of a good mood, which
in turn dampens their motivation to improve a sad mood (Wood
et al., 2009a).
A specific example of emotion regulation, anger management,
shows the need for multilevel explanations. The strategies for
anger management recommended by the American Psychological
Association (APA, 2012) operate at all four levels: social, individ-
ual, neural, and molecular. Social strategies including expressing
concerns with a sympathetic person and moderately communi-
cating with the sources of anger. Humor involving pleasant social
interactions can be a potent way of defusing anger. Temporary
or permanent removal from anger-provoking social environments
can also be helpful.
Psychological strategies for managing anger include the revi-
sions of beliefs, goals, and attitudes. Cognitive therapy aims to
help people by changing dysfunctional thinking, behavior, and
emotion. Dysfunctional aspects of anger can be addressed by
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examining whether the beliefs and goals that underlie angry reac-
tions are inaccurate and modifiable. According to the theory of
emotions as cognitive appraisals, anger is a judgment that some-
one or something is thwarting one’s goals, so that anger should be
reduced by realization either that the goals are not so important or
by revision of beliefs about whatever is thought to be responsible
for goal blocking.
Emotions such as anger, however, are not merely cognitive
judgments, but also simultaneously involve brain perception of
physiological states (Thagard, 2006; Thagard and Aubie, 2008).
Hence it is not surprising that anger management techniques
include various methods for reducing physiological arousal, such
as exercise and relaxation through deep breathing, mediation,
and muscle tensing and release. Reducing physiological arousal
reduces perception of body states performed by the insula and
other brain areas, thereby reducing the overall brain activity that
constitutes anger. Similarly, when oxytocin is administered to
couples discussing a conflict, their positive verbal and non-verbal
behaviors increase (Ditzen et al., 2009).
In severe cases of anger, pharmaceutical treatmentsmay be use-
ful, including anti-depressants such as Prozac that affect the neu-
rotransmitter serotonin, anti-anxiety drugs that affect the neuro-
transmitter GABA (gamma-Aminobutyric acid), and sometimes
even anti-psychotics that affect various other neurotransmitters.
The onset of anger can also be exacerbated by recreational use of
drugs such as alcohol whose effects on brain chemistry are well
known. Hence anger management is an aspect of self-regulation
that operates at the molecular level as well as the higher ones.
Ego-depletion studies demonstrate that when people over-
ride their emotions, thoughts, impulses, or automatic or habitual
behaviors, they have trouble doing so a second time (Baumeister
et al., 2007). For example, in one study, research participants had
to resist freshly-baked chocolate-chip cookies; they were allowed
to eat only radishes instead. When they then faced an impossible
puzzle, they gave up more rapidly than participants who had not
been required to resist the tempting cookies (Baumeister et al.,
1998). In another study, participants who were asked to suppress
certain thoughts subsequently hadmore trouble resisting free beer
than did control participants, even when they expected to take a
driving test (Muraven et al., 2002).
Ego-depletion research has shown connections between the
individual and social levels in twoways. First, difficult social inter-
actions can deplete one’s self-regulatory resources (Vohs et al.,
2005). Interracial interactions, for example, can be taxing if one
tries not to appear prejudiced. Richeson and Shelton (2003) found
that after prejudiced white participants interacted with a black
participant, they performed more poorly on a cognitive control
task, compared to participants who interacted with a white partic-
ipant or participants scoring low in prejudice. Social interactions
also can be depleting if one is required to engage in atypical
self-presentation, such as being boastful to strangers (Vohs et al.,
2005). And in yet another example of the harmful consequences
of social rejection, studies have indicated that it too can impair
self-regulation (see Gailliot et al., 2008, for references).
Second, ego-depletion makes it difficult to navigate social
interactions. Participants who had engaged in previous acts of
unrelated effortful self-regulation later were more egotistical in
their self-descriptions and less able to choose topics for discussion
with a stranger that were appropriate in their level of intimacy
(Vohs et al., 2005). Self-regulatory depletion also may encourage
sexual infidelity and acts of discrimination (Gailliot et al., 2008).
Successful self-regulation, then, may smooth one’s interpersonal
interactions andmake one’s close relationships more harmonious.
It is unclear, however, whether ego-depletion is the result of fun-
damental neural mechanisms of will, or rather individual mech-
anisms of self-representation: Job et al. (2010) report studies that
support the view that reduced self-control after a depleting task or
during demanding periods may reflect people’s beliefs about the
availability of willpower rather than true resource depletion.
People who have sustained damage to the prefrontal cortex
exhibit various self-regulatory deficits, such as impulsivity and
poor judgment (see Gailliot et al., 2008, for references). The
anterior cingulate is involved in tasks that deplete self-regulatory
resources via the coordination of divided attention, and the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex affects the activation, maintenance,
and modification of goal-directed responses (Baumeister et al.,
2003b). Attempts at self-control recruit a network of brain regions
including the lateral and posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cor-
tex (MacDonald et al., 2000). The consensus across thirty neu-
roimaging studies of emotion regulation in particular is that right
ventrolateral PFC and left ventrolateral PFC activity are involved.
Other areas also are implicated, including the presupplementary
motor area, the posterior dorsomedial PFC, left dorsolateral PFC,
and rostral ACC, and their involvement appears to depend on
whether the emotion regulation is intentional or incidental to the
participants’ task (see Lieberman, 2010, for a review).
Research by Richeson et al. (2003) elegantly links the neural,
individual, and social levels of self-regulation. They found that
for White participants who held especially negative unconscious
attitudes toward Blacks, interacting with a Black person led them
to perform poorly on a subsequent self-regulatory task. This effect
was mediated by the extent to which these White participants’
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was activated while they viewed
Black faces (in a separate session).
Molecular mechanisms are also undoubtedly involved in self-
regulation, although few have been identified. Blood glucose has
been thought to underlie ego-depletion phenomena (Gailliot et al.,
2008), but recent evidence has challenged that idea (e.g., Molden
et al., 2012). Oxytocin may well promote self-regulation in the
interpersonal sphere. It appears to lead mothers to tend to their
offspring (Taylor, 2002; Feldman et al., 2007), lead people in
general to seek and provide social support in stressful circum-
stances (Taylor, 2002), and to promote helping behavior (Brown
and Brown, 2006).
In sum, self-effecting phenomena such as self-enhancement
and self-regulation are best understood at multiple mechanistic
levels.
The Changing Self
Self-effecting phenomena involve local changes and behavior, but
there is a final group of phenomena that involve more permanent
changes to the self (Brinthaupt and Lipka, 1994). We cover two
change phenomena: self-expansion and self-development.
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Self-Expansion
According to Aron’s self-expansion theory, human beings have a
central desire to expand the self—to acquire resources, perspec-
tives, and identities that enhance their ability to accomplish goals.
Self expansion is a motivation to enhance potential efficacy (Aron
et al., 2004, p. 105).
This motivation to self-expand at the individual level influ-
ences the social level: Aron et al. (2004) argue that self-expansion
motives lead people to enter andmaintain close relationships with
others. In close relationships, each partner includes the other in
the self, meaning that each takes on the other’s resources, perspec-
tives, and identities to some extent. Evidence for such processes is
illustrated by findings of a study by Aron et al. (1995), who asked
university students to respond to the open-ended question “Who
are you today?” every 2 weeks for 10 weeks. When respondents
had fallen in love during the preceding 2 weeks, their answers
to this question revealed increases in the diversity of their self-
concept, compared to periods when they had not fallen in love and
compared to other respondents who had not fallen in love. They
also showed increased self-efficacy and self-esteem. These results
remained significant even after mood changes were controlled
statistically.
Falling in love also seems to be accompanied by changes in
the brain. fMRI studies show that when people who have recently
fallen intensely in love look at a photo of or think about their
beloved, they have increased activity in the caudate nucleus, which
is a central part of the brain’s reward system, as well as in the right
ventral tegmental area, a region associated with the production
and distribution of dopamine to other brain regions (Aron et al.,
2005). Even subliminal priming with a beloved’s name has similar
effects (Ortigue et al., 2007). These results suggest that passionate
romantic love is associated with dopamine pathways in the reward
system of the brain. These dopaminergic pathways are rich in
oxytocin receptors (Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Fisher et al., 2006).
When women talk about a love experience, oxytocin release is
associated with the extent to which they display affiliation cues
such as smiles and head nods (Gonzaga et al., 2006).
Recent research offers exciting evidence of possible brain
changes with self-expansion. Ortigue and Bianchi-Demicheli
(2010) found that when people were primed with their romantic
partner’s name (and not a friend’s), they showedmore intense acti-
vation of the left angular gyrus, the same region that is activated
when people think of themselves.
Self-Development
Self-development refers to the changes that people naturally
undergo over the course of their lives. Major developmental
periods include early years when infants and toddlers begin to
acquire identities (Bloom, 2004; Rochat, 2009), adolescence when
teenagers establish increasing independence from parents (Syl-
wester, 2007), and old age when physical decline imposes new
limitations on the self. Each of these periods involves extensive
social, individual, neural, andmolecular changes, butwewill focus
on old age, drawing on Breytspraak (1984) and Johnson (2005).
Social relations and the aspects of the self dependent on
them change dramatically as people get older. Major changes
can include the completion of child-rearing, retirement from
employment, diminishing social contacts resulting from physical
disabilities, and loss of friends and family to death or infirmity.
These changes can all affect the quantity and quality of social
interactions that are causally associated with a person’s behaviors
and representations.
At the individual level, there are changes in processes, represen-
tations, and emotions. Cognitive functioning measured by pro-
cessing speed and short-termmemory capability declines steadily
from people’s thirties, and more precipitously in their sixties and
later (Salthouse, 2004). Self-conceptions may be stable in some
respects, but often alter in others, as people define themselves
increasingly in terms of health and physical functioning rather
thanwork roles. People in early stages of old age tend to be happier
than those in middle age, but infirmities can bring substantial
difficulties (Stone et al., 2010).
Neural causes of changes in the self are most evident in extreme
cases like Alzheimer’s disease, when brain degeneration progres-
sively eliminates anything but a minimal sense of self. There are
also age-related disorders such as fronto-temporal dementia that
can drastically diminish self-effecting phenomena such as self-
control (Eslinger et al., 2005). Aging also brings about molecular
changes, for example in reduction of levels of hormones such as
testosterone and estrogen that affect neural processing. Hence for
a combination of social, individual, neural, and molecular rea-
sons, self-development takes on important directions in old age.
Similar observations could be made about other crucial stages of
personal development such as adolescence. The changing self, like
the representing and effecting self, operates through multilevel
interacting mechanisms.
Conclusion
We have shown the relevance of social, individual, neural, and
molecular levels to seven important phenomena: self-concepts,
self-presentation, self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-regulation,
self-expansion, and self-development. These seven are represen-
tative of three general classes (self-representing, self-effecting,
and self-changing) that cover more than eighty self-phenomena
important in psychological discussions of the self.
A full theory of the self will need to specify much more
about the nature of the mechanisms at each level, and equally
importantly, will need to specify much more about the relations
between the levels. Thagard (2014) argued against the common
reductionist assumption that causation runs only upward from
molecular to neural to individual to social mechanisms. A social
interaction such as one person complimenting another has effects
on individuals’ mental representations, on neural firing, and on
molecular processes such as ones involving dopamine and oxy-
tocin. Fuller explanation of the more than eighty self-phenomena
that we have classified in this paper will require elucidation of how
they each result from multilevel interactions.
Explanations of complex systems often identify emergent prop-
erties, which belong to wholes but not to their parts because they
result from the interactions of their parts (Findlay and Thagard,
2012). This basic idea of emergence concerns only the connec-
tions of two levels, where the properties of wholes at the higher
level (e.g., consciousness) emerge from interactions of parts at
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the lower levels (neurons). Thinking of the self as resulting from
multiple interacting mechanisms points to a more complicated
kind of emergence that has gone unrecognized. Multilevel emer-
gence occurs when the property of a whole such as the self results
from interactions in mechanisms at several different levels, in
this case molecular and social as well as neural and cognitive.
What you are as a self depends on your genes and your social
influences as well as on your semantic pointers and mental repre-
sentations.Major changes in the self such as religious conversions,
dramatic career shifts, and recovery frommental illness are critical
transitions that result from interactions among multiple levels.
For example, recovery from severe depression often requires (1)
changes in neurotransmitters through medication operating at
the molecular and neural levels and (2) changes in beliefs and
goals through psychotherapy operating at the mental and social
levels. Future theoretical work on the self will benefit from more
detailed accounts of the interactions of individual, social, neural,
and molecular mechanisms.
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